Inventories and the concentration of suppliers and customers: Evidence from the Chinese manufacturing sector by Casalin F et al.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This work is licensed under a  
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International licence 
 
 
Newcastle University ePrints - eprint.ncl.ac.uk 
 
Casalin F, Pang G, Maioli S, Cao T.  
Inventories and the concentration of suppliers and customers: Evidence from 
the Chinese manufacturing sector.  
International Journal of Production Economics 2017, 193, 148-159. 
 
 
Copyright: 
© 2017. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license 
DOI link to article: 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2017.07.010  
Date deposited:   
10/07/2017 
Embargo release date: 
12 January 2019  
1 
 
Inventories and the concentration of suppliers and customers: Evidence from 
the Chinese manufacturing sector 
Fabrizio Casalin*, Gu Pang, Sara Maioli, Ting Cao 
Newcastle University Business School, 5 Barrack Road, Newcastle upon Tyne, UK, NE1 4SE 
 
Abstract 
This study investigates the links between supplier- and customer-base concentrations, and 
inventory holdings in the Chinese manufacturing sector. Using financial data from a cohort of 516 
companies, we find that firms that face higher supplier density - benefiting from better co-
ordination with suppliers - hold fewer inventories, whereas firms with higher customer density 
retain larger inventories, as a result of the bargaining power exercised by customers. We then 
extend the analysis by investigating the impact of account payables, receivables and bad debt 
reserves, finding that inventory holdings are positively associated with the two forms of financing, 
and negatively associated with bad debts. This last relationship, however, becomes less severe 
when firms have access to large volumes of payables. Finally, we show that the above results hold 
– with varying degrees of similarity - also when we partition the dataset into six homogenous 
industrial segments. Overall, this study contributes to the growing literature on inventories and 
the structure of the supply chain by shedding new light on the importance of both supplier and 
customer densities, as well as the volume of payables and receivables, for inventory management. 
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1. Introduction 
Inventories are essential, unavoidable components of the business activity of firms as they 
serve as a strategic tool to achieve customer satisfaction and profit maximization (Ho et al, 2015). 
For instance, given the widespread adoption of Just-In-Time (JIT) practices, managers often view 
inventories as an indicator of process capability and efficiency (see, e.g., Lieberman and 
Demeester, 1999, and Lieberman and Asaba, 1997). Moreover, some recent studies have shown 
that firms with volatile inventories underperform in the stock markets (Allen et al., 2013).  
The literature has traditionally focussed on the linkage between inventory levels of 
manufacturing firms and micro-level indicators.1 Many scholars have documented a positive 
relationship with non-financial indicators such as the uncertainty in demand, production lead 
times, variety in the specification of products sold and number of dealerships, as well as a negative 
linkage with firms’ size. The relationship between inventory levels and financial indicators is 
instead less clear-cut. For instance, a number of studies finds that the linkage with various 
specifications of gross income margins varies from positive to negative depending on the type of 
industry analyzed. Focussing instead on the financial strength of firms, Caglayan et al. (2012) 
show that firms with more liquid assets are associated with lower levels of inventory.  
A more recent strand of research has focused on the cooperation among firms in the upper- 
and lower-stream of the supply chain as a tool to achieve efficiency in working capital 
management. The underlying idea is that inventories can be efficiently managed only by 
developing partnerships with both suppliers and customers. These last, in fact, can help firms 
secure timely deliveries of raw materials, work-in-process, and final goods, with the agreed 
standard of quality. For instance, a well-known supply-chain practice is the Vendor Managed 
Inventory (VMI), where the manufacturer firms hand over the inventory replenishment decisions 
onto their suppliers. The advantage of VMI agreements is that they improve coordination and 
information sharing which help mitigate demand uncertainty, thereby allowing for leaner 
inventories. 
                                                          
1 A companion strand of studies investigates the linkage between inventories and macroeconomic indicators. For 
example, Chen et al. (2005) find that when the interest rate rises the levels of inventory drop - as they become more 
expensive relative to holding bonds – whereas when managers hold optimistic views on future economic outlook 
then inventories increase. 
3 
 
A specific form of cooperation among firms hinges on the issuance of receivables and 
payables. These last are financial tools used to extend credit to customers and to finance the 
purchasing of supplies. Recently, scholars have focussed their interest on the linkage between 
inventories and the volume of payables and receivables, as they can affect the purchasing of raw 
materials as well as sales of finished goods and, ultimately, the elasticity of inventories. While the 
literature on payables and inventory holdings is still relatively scarce, the link between receivables 
and inventories have been extensively scrutinized, with empirical results which are however 
inconclusive and dependant on the type of countries and industries. Early studies, in fact, have 
highlighted that firms, by increasing accounts receivables, can sell more and hold fewer 
inventories, whereas more recently scholars have shown that the opposite link holds.  
A different form of cooperation consists of shaping the size and composition of the 
supplier and customer bases, so that firms can better liaise with their counterparties in the upper- 
and lower-stream of the supply chain. The links between supplier and customer density, and 
inventory holdings are ex-ante unclear and still largely unexplored. Focussing on the lower end 
of the supply chain, scholars have identified two competing views on how customer density 
affects inventory holdings, namely the Bargaining Power and OM views (see Ak and Patatoukas, 
2016). According to the former, firms facing a concentrated customer-base are held captive by 
their counterparties and forced to retain excess inventories. Less concentrated bases, instead, 
would generate diversification benefits that make firms less exposed to peaks and troughs in sales. 
The latter puts forward the idea that a limited number of major customers would facilitate closer 
partnerships, enabling firms to minimize inventory holdings, whereas less concentrated bases 
would make the cooperation more difficult. An alternative explanation to the OM view is the so-
called Demand Fragmentation Hypothesis according to which lower concentration of customers 
would cause a fragmentation of the demand, leading to increased volatility of sales and larger 
inventories (see Cachon and Olivares, 2010). The strand of research on the upper end of the supply 
chain is even scarcer, with virtually no studies investigating the relationship between supplier 
density and inventories. Thus, in order to postulate the type of relationship linking the 
concentration of suppliers with inventories, we draw on two close strands of studies that implicitly 
acknowledge the existence of such a link. The first one is based on the idea that the consolidation 
in the volume of supplies enables a closer and more profitable relationship between the firm and 
its suppliers. This is the so-called Volume Consolidation argument proposed by Cai et al. (2010). 
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The second one consists of the aforementioned studies on the link between customer density and 
inventories. In fact, the two alternative views proposed by these last – i.e. the Bargaining Power 
and OM views – can easily be adapted to model the relationship between the upper end of the 
supply chain and inventory holdings. Overall, this literature is in the early stages of development, 
with only a handful of studies that focus on the links between customer-base and inventory 
holdings, and virtually no evidence available for non-US firms. In fact, an important limitation to 
the development of this strand of research is that data on customer- and supply-bases are not 
readily available, and they must be manually collected from financial statements.2  
This study contributes toward the above literature in a number of different aspects. Firstly, 
we investigate the link between the concentration of customers (CC) and inventory holdings for 
a large sample of 516 listed Chinese firms. Secondly, we extend our analysis to the upper end of 
the supply chain by shedding light on the link between the concentration of suppliers (SC) and 
levels of inventory. By doing so we are able to study the impact of the two types of densities on 
inventories within a unifying setting. Finally, we contribute to the literature on inventories and 
trade finance by investigating how payables and receivables affect inventory holdings. To 
examine the above relationships we hand-collect data on the volume of transactions with the 5 
largest suppliers and customers for each firm. Since such data are not readily available from the 
usual academic sources, we retrieve them from the annual financial statements using a text-
sourcing algorithm. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first attempt to unravel the 
relationships among supply- and customer-bases, payables and receivables, and inventory 
holdings for the Chinese manufacturing sector.  
Our empirical results suggest that firms facing more concentrated bases of suppliers hold 
significantly fewer absolute and relative inventories, whereas more concentrated customer-bases 
are associated with larger inventory holdings. This last relationship, however, is weaker and only 
occurs for relative inventories. These results provide strong support to the OM view that 
concentrated supply-bases are associated with lower inventory levels, whereas for the lower end 
of the supply chain we find evidence in favor of the Bargaining Power view. We then expand our 
                                                          
2 For instance, Ak and Patatoukas (2016) study US manufacturing firms by hand-collecting data on customer densities, whereas Cachon and 
Olivares (2010) focus their analysis only on the four largest US car manufactures.  
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analysis by investigating three additional hypotheses that link with the literature on financial flows 
(account payables and receivables), financial performances (levels of bad debts) and inventory 
holdings. Our results suggest that these last are positively associated with both payables and 
receivables, whereas the level of bad debts negatively affects inventories. We also find that firms 
less financially constrained - i.e. firms with large access to account payables - are less sensitive 
to the level of bad debts than firms with limited access to payables. 
The above results hold after controlling for a large array of firm-specific characteristics such 
as size, margins, effects of economies of scale, as well as industry fixed effects. More specifically, 
in line with the predictions of classical inventory models (like the Newsvendor and EOQ models), 
we find that absolute inventories are positively associated with higher margins and economies of 
scale, whereas we obtain weak evidence that relative inventory levels are negatively associated 
with the size of firms. We then supplement our analysis by carrying out the same hypothesis 
testing for six homogenous industrial segments – i.e. Machinery, Electronics, Chemicals, 
Pharmaceutical, Food & Beverages and Metal Manufacturing - finding that most of the 
hypotheses hold when tested on disaggregated data, although there are some significant 
differences across segments. 
The paper is organized follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant literature. Section 3 
specifies the research hypotheses. Section 4 describes the dataset, sets out the empirical models 
as well as the econometric methodologies. Section 5 discusses the empirical results. Finally, 
section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  Literature Review  
What is the link between supplier density, customer density, and inventory holdings? Does 
the volume of payables and receivables affect the level of inventories? In this section, we discuss 
the strands of literature on which we build our empirical analysis. We start by discussing the large 
body of research in the Operations Management literature which investigates the determinants of 
inventory holdings. We then focus on the more recent studies on the link between trade finance – 
in the form of account payables and receivables – and inventories. Finally, we discuss the latest 
developments in the literature that explore the costs and benefits for firms arising from specific 
structures of the supply chain.   
2.1 Financial/Non-financial Indicators and Inventory holdings 
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A large strand of studies investigates the relationship between firms’ balance sheet 
indicators and inventory holdings of manufacturing firms. Focussing on non-financial indicators, 
Fisher and Ittner (1999), and Lieberman et al. (1999) show that, for firms in the car assembly 
sectors, the levels of inventory are affected by set-up and holding costs, production lead times, 
level of coordination with customers, as well as the variety of products offered. Cachon and 
Olivares (2010) focus on the four largest US automobile manufacturers and find that a higher 
number of dealerships makes the demand of final products more volatile, thus leading to larger 
inventory, whereas a wider range of variants in final products reduces demand volatility and 
inventory holdings. Rumyantsev and Netessine (2007) consider a larger cohort of US firms and 
show that demand uncertainty, longer lead times and higher gross margins are associated with 
higher levels of inventories, whereas larger firms retain relatively fewer inventories than smaller 
firms (see also Gaur et al. (2005)). The literature on the links between inventories and financial 
indicators is also rather vast. A number of studies documents a negative link between the 
profitability of firms and inventory levels which holds for different inventory specifications, 
industries and time periods (see, e.g., Deloof (2003), Capkun et al. (2009), and Kroes and Manikas 
(2014)). Eroglu and Hofer (2011) show that such link is concave, so that there is an optimal level 
of inventory leanness beyond which firms’ profits deteriorate.  
2.2 Trade Finance and Inventory Holdings 
The more recent literature on inventory holdings and trade finance (in the form of payables 
and receivables) builds on the idea that cooperation in the upper- and lower-stream of the supply 
chain is a key tool for effective working capital management. For instance, Chikán (2009, 2011) 
argues that - given the growing complexity of inventory management – firms can efficiently 
manage inventories only as parts of their supply chain. This strand of research is substantial and 
focusses mainly on the lower end of the supply chain. Payables are normally treated as a financial 
resource, as payments to suppliers are postponed and the cash spared used by the company in 
operations, whereas receivables can be seen as an investment with the goals of boosting sales, 
beating the competition, and improve relationships with customers. Fabbri and Klapper (2009) 
study the influence of trade credit on supply chain participants and find that firms are more likely 
to extend trade loans to customers if they receive higher credit levels from suppliers. Focussing 
on the lower end of the supply chain, Mittal (2010) emphasizes that receivable policies could 
affect the profitability as well as the financial risks taken by firms. On the one hand, lenient credit 
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policies could help firms boost sales, but also increase the risk of bad debts. On the other hand, 
by adopting tighter credit policies, firms increase their liquidity and reduce the probability of bad 
debts, but the profitability could also decrease. Thus, striking a balance between profitability and 
risks of bad debt is the main goal of receivables management. Bougheas et al. (2009) argue that 
accounts receivables are important for the performance of inventory management, whereas the 
impact of payables is negligible. For a given aggregate demand, these authors show that firms can 
minimize the inventory costs by increasing receivables in order to sell more, and thus hold less 
inventory. Caglayan et al. (2012) investigate the empirical linkages between company’s inventory 
decisions and their financial strength, showing that inventories decline as firms hold more liquid 
assets or extend more net trade credit to customers. A competing strand of studies has instead 
shown that inventory holding is positively correlated with both the volumes of trade credit and 
debit (see, among others, Fabbri and Klapper, 2009; Brigham and Houston, 2009; Mittal, 2010). 
As emphasized by Ferrando and Mulier (2013), what matters is not the separate role of payables 
or receivables, but the combination of the two working as a credit channel. All in all, both 
customer receivables and supplier payables are two crucial working capital measures.  
2.3 Performance Indicators and Supply Chain Structure 
The linkage between performance indicators and the supply chain structure is the object 
of a recent strand of research. For instance, Hofmann and Kotzab (2010) show that the lack of 
coordination with suppliers can result in higher costs of goods sold in comparison with 
competitors that establish more collaborative practices. Scholars have modeled the upper and 
lower end of the supply chain mainly through the concepts of supplier and customer density, i.e. 
on the idea that firms can rely on many rather than few suppliers, and they can sell to many rather 
than few customers. Cai et al (2010) emphasize how heightened competition to reduce costs, 
improve quality and increase efficiency can lead firms to reduce the number of suppliers in the 
attempt of achieving better coordination with these last (see also Fisher, 1997). Ogden (2006) 
finds that there are several critical success factors behind the practice of supply base reduction, 
such as effective information sharing, managing relationships, and choosing the right suppliers. 
Lorentz et al (2016) collect data on about 550 Finnish manufacturers and show that there is an 
optimal level of supply-base complexity – as measured by the geographic dispersion of suppliers 
- that minimizes supply chain risks. Demeeter and Golini (2014) is the only study that investigates 
the link between features of the upper-stream supply chain and inventory holdings. By gathering 
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survey data for as many as 500 firms internationally, the authors show that vertical integration, 
information sharing, and local sourcing are drivers of inventory configurations.  
Also the linkage between performance indicators and the structure of the lower-stream 
supply chain remains largely unexplored. For instance, Patatoukas (2012) shows that more 
concentrated customer bases are positively associated with financial performances (see also Irvine 
et al, 2016). Dhaliwal et al (2016) document a positive link between customer concentration and 
firms’ cost of capital, suggesting that more concentrated customer bases increase the risk of losing 
market shares, resulting in higher financing costs (see also Campello and Gao (2017)). On the 
contrary, Cen et al (2016) find that firms facing more concentrated customer bases benefit from 
an implicit certification provided by large customers that have incentives to monitor suppliers. 
Such certification, in turn, enables firms to reap lower interest rates on loans. Finally, Ak and 
Patatoukas (2016), and Cachon and Olivares (2010), are the only two studies that examine the 
link between customer bases and inventories. The former, using hand-collected data of about 600 
US manufacturer firms, document a negative association between customers’ concentration and 
inventory holdings, whereas the latter find similar results for the four largest US car manufacturers. 
However, as Ak and Patatoukas (2016) emphasize, the above link remains ex-ante unclear. On 
the one hand, large customers have bargaining power and can exercise pressure on their suppliers 
to maintain larger inventory holdings (Bargaining Power view).3 On the other hand, firms dealing 
with a limited number of customers can better implement supply-chain practices that mitigate 
demand uncertainty and reduces inventory holdings (OM view).4 As already emphasized, this last 
strand of research is still in the early stages of development, with a handful of studies based on 
US data for customer density only, and extremely limited evidence available on non-US firms.5  
 
3. Research Hypotheses  
                                                          
3 For example, under the practice of consignment inventory, large customers compel the manufacturer to retain 
ownership of the items delivered until the customer re-sell these last.    
4 An example of such practices is the so-called Collaborative Planning, Forecasting, and Replenishment (CPFR) 
where the manufacturer and its customers set up a common platform to exchange demand forecast updates, so that 
demand uncertainty can be mitigated (see, e.g., Ren et al. 2010, Terwiesch et al. 2005). 
5 For instance, Patatoukas (2012), Ak and Patatoukas (2016), and Dhaliwal et al (2016) extract information on 
costumers from the Compustat Segment Files. However, this type of data is not available in electronic format for 
non-US firms, and as such they must be hand-collected from financial statements.  
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Inventory, unlike sales, is one of the few variables that are largely determined by internal 
decisions made by firms. As discussed above, a large body of literature has shown that firms hold 
inventories because of a mismatch between the timing of production and sale of products, because 
the demand for final products is characterised by seasonality and volatility and production 
capacity adapts to changes in demand with a time lag, and because there are economies of scale 
in handling inventories. Moreover, a parallel strand of research has highlighted the role of firm-
level financial indicators - such as liquidity as well as volumes of receivables and payables - as 
determinants of inventories. Recently, a handful of scholars has put forward the idea that the 
structure of upper and lower end supply chain might have an impact on inventory holdings (see 
Ak and Patatoukas, 2016, and Cachon and Olivares, 2010). We now introduce eight testable 
hypotheses that draw on the above strands of literature. 
The literature on volume consolidation argues that firms dealing with fewer suppliers have 
more scope for coordination and exchange of information (see, among others, Cai et al., 2010). If 
there existed a mutual exchange of information, then the trading partners could potentially 
coordinate delivery time and quantities to maximize their respective profits. In such a scenario, 
the optimal quantity to stock would be monotonically decreasing with the number of suppliers. 
We can postulate the occurrence of a similar link between supplier density and inventories by 
applying the OM view to the upper end of the supply chain. On the contrary, if the suppliers held 
more bargaining power, then firms might be forced to stock up more for precautionary reasons. 
Thus, we formulate the hypothesis that higher supplier density, implying better cooperation with 
suppliers, leads to lower inventory holdings: 
HYPOTHESIS 1: Aggregate inventory level is negatively related to the density of suppliers. 
Ak and Patatoukas (2016) argue that higher customer density, by enabling better 
cooperation, leads to lower inventory holdings. This is the so-called OM view applied to the lower 
end of the supply chain. Taken from a different angle, scholars have also put forward the idea that 
fragmenting demand across different products, variety of a given product, or different geographic 
locations leads to a more volatile demand and higher inventories (see, e.g., Cachon and Olivares, 
2010). In line with these studies, we test the following hypothesis:  
HYPOTHESIS 2: Aggregate inventory level is negatively related to the density of costumers. 
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The literature on the relationship among inventories, account payables and receivables has 
provided two competing views. On the one hand, Bougheas et al. (2009) found that inventory 
holdings decline as firms extend more credit to customers (see also Caglayan et al., 2012). This 
result can be explained by the behavior of firms decreasing the stock of inventories when they sell 
on credit, and increasing inventories when they buy on credit from suppliers. On the other hand, 
Fabbri and Klapper (2009) have shown that firms’ inventory investment is positively correlated 
with the volume of both trade credit and trade debt (see also Brigham and Houston, 2009; Mittal, 
2010). This strand of the studies highlights the importance for a firm of receiving trade credit from 
its suppliers in order to finance the production and to extend trade credit, so that goods can be 
sold to financially constrained customers (see Ferrando and Mulier, 2013). Thus, we formulate 
the following hypothesis: 
HYPOTHESIS 3: Aggregate inventory level is positively associated with both trade credit and 
trade payments. 
A substantial strand of literature has investigated the relationship between inventories and 
financial flows (see, among others, Gaur and Bhattacharya, 2011; Kroes and Manikas 2014). 
Rather than focussing on these last, we tackle the issue from a different angle and we look into 
the link between stocks of bad debts held by firms and inventory holdings. We argue that firms 
might be negatively affected by trade debtors going into financial distress and hence delaying or 
defaulting on payments. In fact, firms with large accumulated bad debts might suffer from denied 
access to trade credit as they become more financially vulnerable, and the more severe are such 
financial constraints the higher will be the sensitivity of inventories to bad debts. By taking the 
volume of payables as indicator of the level of financial constraints of firms, we investigate the 
link between bad debts and inventories by formulating the following two hypotheses:  
HYPOTHESIS 4: Aggregate inventory levels are negatively related with the level of bad debts. 
HYPOTHESIS 5: The sensitivity of aggregate inventory levels to changes in bad debts decreases 
with the volume of payables. 
We then test for three additional hypotheses extensively explored for developed 
economies, yet relatively unexplored for emerging economies such as China (see, e.g., 
Rumyantsev and Netessine, 2007). The first hypothesis focusses on absolute inventory and mean 
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demand. Its theoretical foundation can be found in the EOQ model which derives a square-root 
relationship between inventories and demand. Such relationship holds even when the demand is 
stochastic (Johnson and Montgomery, 1974). If, however, inventory ordering costs are minimal 
like in the Newsvendor or the Order-up-to model, the relationship between inventory and demand 
becomes linear (Cachon and Terwiesch, 2013). By aggregating over products with or without 
ordering costs, we should observe a concave relationship between expected demand and average 
inventory levels. Hence: 
HYPOTHESIS 6: Aggregate inventory level is positively associated with aggregate mean 
demand through a concave function. 
This hypothesis can be extended by the consideration that there exist economies of scale in 
inventory management because manufacturing and distribution require high fixed costs. The EOQ 
model considers fixed inventory ordering costs and shows that inventories increase more slowly 
than demand. Consequently, a firm facing larger mean demand, i.e. a larger firm, should exhibit 
economies of scale in inventory management. This can also be explained by risk pooling since a 
larger firm can afford to hold relatively fewer inventories because it pools together demand from 
various products, locations, stores or warehouses (see Eppen, 1979). Thus, we formulate the 
following hypothesis:  
HYPOTHESIS 7: Aggregate relative inventory level (i.e. the ratio of inventory to sales) is 
negatively associated with the size of firms. 
A typical trade-off studied by classical stochastic inventory models is the one between 
underage costs and overage costs - i.e. the costs of having too little or too much inventory. Larger 
underage costs lead to higher inventories in these models (see Silver et al. 1998). The underage 
cost is typically assumed to be the product’s gross margin. This seems reasonable in the case of 
lost sales. But even in the case of full back ordering, Cachon and Terwiesch (2013) show that the 
penalty for stocking out is likely to be correlated with the product’s margin. Assuming that higher 
margins correspond to higher costs of underage, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
HYPOTHESIS 8: Aggregate inventory level is positively associated with aggregate product 
margins. 
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4. Data 
We gather a representative sample of 516 Chinese listed manufacturing companies. Such 
companies are required to provide operational and financial information following the standard 
accounting principles defined by the China Securities Regulatory Commission. We access 
corporate reports for the year 2012 via the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stocks Exchange website 
(www.cninfo.com.cn). We collect data for firms listed on the A-share markets, whereas we 
exclude firms listed on the B- and H-share segments.6 We exclude the service, construction, and 
transportation industries and focus only on manufacturing firms, which are traditionally the most 
inventory-rich segments of the economy. Within the manufacturing industry we focus on six 
segments: Machinery, Electronics, Chemicals, Pharmaceutical, Food & Beverages and Metal 
Manufacturing. 7  From these segments, we excluded companies that have merged or been 
acquired, as well as companies that had zero sales and inventory. This filtering process ensures 
that the final sample contains only companies that have been actively operating in inventory-
related business activities. For each firm, we hand-collect data on the volume of transactions with 
the 5 largest suppliers and customers.8 Since such data are not readily available from any data 
provider, we retrieve them from the annual financial statements by using a text-sourcing algorithm, 
and manually check that the identified matches correspond to the data we actually need. Such 
dataset is then matched with an array of balance sheet indicators containing inventories, assets, 
sales, payables, receivables, as well as other firm-level indicators.   
We denote absolute inventory for firm i by 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑖, which is expressed in monetary terms at 
the end of 2012 as reported in the annual financial statements. Relative inventory is measured by 
the ratio of inventory to cost of goods sold (𝐶𝑜𝐺𝑆𝑖), and it is denoted by 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑖 = 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑖/𝐶𝑜𝐺𝑆𝑖. 
                                                          
6 A-shares are traded on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges whereas B-shares are owned by foreign 
investors. H-shares refer to shares of companies incorporated in mainland China that are traded on the Hong-Kong 
Stock Exchange. Both B- and H-shares must comply with different account standards, which make the corporate 
reports not comparable with those of companies listed on the A-share market. 
7 Our dataset includes also a small number of companies which operate in segments different from the six reported 
above. More specifically, there are 14 companies in the petroleum, coking and nuclear fuel processing, 10 in the 
rubber and plastic products, 9 in the paper products, 6 in the furniture manufacturing and 3 in other manufacturing. 
8 The disclosure of the five major suppliers and customers is mandatory according to the Standards for the Contents 
and Formats of Information Disclosure by Companies offering Securities to the Public No. 2 (Chapter II, art. 21). 
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The cost of goods sold represents the cost of products sold over the financial year, and it includes 
all costs of purchase and conversion, and other costs allocated to goods sold.  
Following Banerjee et al. (2008), we adopt a measure of customer concentration that 
consists of the ratio between the volume of sales obtained from the 5 largest customers and the 
total volume of sales (see also Campello and Gao, 2017).9 We then construct an equivalent 
measure for the supply-base concentration. The two measures are therefore specified as follows:  
 CCi =
∑ Salesij
5
j=1
Salesi
⁄     (1) 
SCi =
∑ Purij
5
j=1
Puri
⁄      (2)  
where Salesij and Purij represent the firm i’s sales to the major customer j, and the purchasing 
from the major supplier j, and  Salesi and Puri represent the total sales and purchasing. The two 
ratios range from 0 to 1 - where lower (higher) values correspond to less (more) concentrated 
bases - and capture the relative importance of major customers and suppliers in the firm’s annual 
revenues and costs. 
Account Receivables (𝐴𝑐𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖) and Account Payables (𝐴𝑐𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑖) are respectively the volume 
of trade credit that firms extend to customers and the volume of trade borrowing that firms obtain 
from suppliers. Also these two variables are expressed in monetary terms at the end of 2012, as 
reported in the annual financial statements. 
Bad debt reserves represent the amount of cash set aside for possible reductions in the book 
value of account receivables. High levels of bad debt reserves indicate poor quality of account 
receivables, and it negatively affects the firm’s working capital position. The Bad Debt Ratio is 
calculated as 𝐵𝑎𝑑𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖 = 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐵𝑎𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑖 
/𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖. 
Fixed Assets (𝐹𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖) refers to all non-current assets, and includes tangible, intangible 
and other fixed assets. Fixed assets are used as proxy for the size of companies, and the relative 
figures can be extracted from the annual statement.  
                                                          
9 Both these studies use a measure of concentration based on the sum of the percentage sales generating from a set of 
major customers defined as those with a share of total sales of at least 10%.   
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Gross Margin Ratio (𝐺𝑀𝐺𝑖) represents the generated margin between sales and the costs of 
goods sold, which provides the most fundamental and important source of profits. This ratio 
measures how well the firm manages the selling of products and reduces costs allocated to 
products sold, and it is calculated as 𝐺𝑀𝐺𝑖 = (𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖 − 𝐶𝑜𝐺𝑆𝑖)/𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖.  
Table 1 reports some preliminary statistics for the above industrial segments. Figures 
suggest that companies in the sample hold on average ¥1,954 million of inventory and produce 
on average $8,865 million of annual sales for the year 2012. Companies vary in size across 
segments, with those in the machinery and metal manufacturing segments showing larger size. 
Also relative inventory levels vary by segment: electronics and pharmaceutical segments have the 
largest relative inventory levels (0.724 and 0.622 respectively), whereas the food & beverages 
segment is the smallest with a relative inventory ratio of 0.149. Differences in terms of supplier 
and customer densities across segments are less evident, with the only exception being the 
pharmaceutical sector where both are significantly below the average values. Figures 1 and 2 plot 
the kernel probability distributions for both the absolute and relative inventory ratios. Both the 
diagrams suggest that the above variables for the six segments are characterised by different 
empirical distributions. We carry out statistical tests for equality in mean, median, variance and 
distributions. The above statistics soundly reject the null of equality in mean, median, variance 
and distributions at standard significance levels, suggesting that both absolute inventories and 
relative inventory ratios for the six segments are statistically different.10  
TABLES 1 AND 2 HERE 
FIGURES 1 AND 2 HERE 
 
5. Methodology 
In line with previous studies, we use two multiplicative regression models to capture the 
dynamics of inventories and to test the hypotheses previously set out. Similar specifications have 
                                                          
10 More specifically, this analysis is conducted by carrying out 2-sample t-statistics for the null of equality in mean, Mann-Whitney Test for the 
null of equality in median, Levene test for the null of equality in variance, and Barnett and Eisen (1982) and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for the 
null of equality in distribution. Results are not reported to save space but are available from the authors upon request.  
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been extensively used in previous studies such as Gaur et al. (2005), and Rumyantsev and 
Netessine (2007). The first model considers absolute inventory levels as dependent variable 
whereas the second focuses on relative inventory levels. The specification of the model for 
absolute inventory levels is: 
(3)ε)log(AcPay)tlog(BadDebα
)tlog(BadDebα)log(AcRecα)log(AcPayα
)log(CCα)log(SCα)log(GMGα)log(CoGSαα)log(Inv
iii9
i8i7i6
i5i4i3i21i



 
The model for relative inventory levels is similarly defined with the only exception being that we 
control for firm size by excluding CoGS and by including FAssets to avoid any possible problem 
of collinearity: 
(4)ε)log(AcPay)tlog(BadDebβ
)tlog(BadDebβ)log(AcRecβ)log(AcPayβ
)log(CCβ)log(SCβ)log(GMGβ)slog(FAssetββ)/CoGSlog(Inv
iii9
i8i7i6
i5i4i3i21ii



where for both the specifications i spans from 1 to 516. We use log-log models because it helps 
deal with heteroscedasticity and with the distribution of inventory data that is not normal but 
skewed to the right. Moreover, such models have been shown to be the most appropriate 
specifications in previous studies.11 Given that we find significant differences in inventory data 
across different industries, we control for this by supplementing both Eqs. (3) and (4) with 
industry dummies in the intercept.  
Table 2 reports some preliminary statistics for all the above variables. The lower panel sets 
out the correlation indices together with the relative eigenvalues. Figures suggest that the above 
variables are actually correlated. The first seven eigenvalues account for approximately 98 percent 
of the total, which implies that the variation in the 8th independent variables can be represented 
in 7 dimensions, suggesting that collinearity in the explanatory variables could be an issue. More 
specifically, the presence of collinearity is generated by the high correlation between the variables 
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐵𝑎𝑑𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖) and   𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐵𝑎𝑑𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖)   ×  𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐴𝑐𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑖). Collinearity, by inflating the standard 
errors of parameter estimates, might reduce their statistical and economic significance. As such, 
                                                          
11 Moreover, by using the log-log specification the slope coefficients of both Eqs.(3) and (4) can be interpreted as elasticities.  
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in the next section we will make use of econometric methods that correct for such undesirable 
effects.  
We initially carry out empirical estimations of Eqs. (3) and (4) by using standard 
heteroscedasticity consistent (Eicher-White) OLS estimators. While OLS provides consistent and 
asymptotically normal estimates under a broad range of assumptions, it is well known that the 
same estimates are sensitive to outliers or fat-tailed distributions of the disturbance term (see 
Greene, 2003, p. 448). When there are reasons to believe that the above conditions occur, it makes 
sense to use alternative estimators that are less sensitive than standard OLS to tail values. One 
such estimator is the Least Absolute Deviations (LAD). LAD estimators are consistent and 
asymptotically normal under broader assumptions than those required for OLS. Their drawback 
relative to OLS estimators is that they will be less efficient if disturbance terms are well-behaved 
(see, e.g., Koenker and Bassett, 1978).  
To account for the undesirable effects of collinearity, we carry out empirical estimates of 
Eqs. (3) and (4) by using both Mixed Regression (MR) and Ridge Regression (RR) methods. The 
MR technique combines sample data with prior linear stochastic constraints on the parameters of 
the model. Its principal advantages over standard OLS are that, under appropriate circumstances, 
MR estimators are superior in mean squared error and can mitigate the effects of collinearity (see 
Belsey et al, 1980). We feed MR estimators with priors taken from LAD estimates. In contrast to 
standard OLS estimators, RR methods add a constant k to each diagonal element of the cross-
product matrix of the explanatory variables before it is inverted (see Hoerl et al., 1975). While 
this introduces bias into the coefficient estimates, the inflated variances are simultaneously 
reduced. Extensive Monte Carlo simulation experiments support the use of RR when the 
independent variables are highly correlated, and several successful applications of ridge analysis 
have been reported.  
We carry out OLS, LAD, MR and RR estimates of Eqs. (3) and (4) for the pooled dataset. 
We then re-estimate the same relationships when the dataset is partitioned into the 6 industrial 
segments previously set out.  For this last exercise, we report only OLS and LAD empirical results 
to save space.12 To check the robustness of our results we carry out Breusch-Pagan, Harvey and 
                                                          
12 Empirical results for MR and RR are very similar to those based on OLS and LAD regressions, and are available from the authors upon 
request. 
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White tests for the null of homoscedastic versus the alternative of heteroscedasticity of different 
forms. We then compute RESET tests for the null of correct functional form, as well as 
MacKinnon et al. (1983) statistics to test whether standard additional or log-log specifications are 
the most appropriate functional form.13 Finally, we re-estimate the two equations in slightly 
different specifications, on a reduced dataset, and with a set of explanatory variables slightly 
modified by using alternative methods such as cluster-robust regressions.  
6. Results 
Empirical estimates of Eqs. (3) and (4) are reported in Table 3. In order to isolate the 
empirical results from the effects of possible outliers, we estimate the two specifications on a 
restricted dataset of 511 firms constructed by dropping observations for which the standardized 
residuals, obtained from a previous OLS regression estimated on the full sample, are in absolute 
value greater than 3.5. Both specifications explain a sizeable share of absolute and relative 
inventory total variability, as the adjusted R-squared statistics are respectively 0.82 and 0.33. 
Similar goodness of fit is obtained for LAD, MR and RR estimates, as well as for the segment-
specific regressions reported in Tables 4 and 5.14  
When we focus on the role played by the upper- and lower-stream of the supply chain, we 
find strong evidence in support of Hypothesis 1 - as higher supplier density has negative and 
statistically significant impact at the 1% level on both absolute and relative inventories. For 
instance, an increase of 1% in supplier density is associated with a decrease in absolute and 
relative inventories of 0.12 and 0.18% respectively. Thus, in line with the OM view, we find that 
higher supplier concentration - enabling better co-ordination between firms and suppliers - leads 
to lower inventory levels. From Tables 4 and 5 we can see that such negative and significant 
relationship is particularly strong for the Electronics and Chemicals segments, whereas the same 
link weakens for the remaining industries.  
Focusing now on the customer density, we find strong evidence that higher concentration is 
associated with larger relative inventory. The same link becomes somehow weaker for absolute 
                                                          
13 The MacKinnon et al. (1983) test is constructed under the null that the log-log is the correct specification.  
14 We carry out empirical estimates of Eqs (3) and (4) by using LAD estimators which are consistent and asymptotically normal under broader 
assumptions than are required for OLS. This feature of LAD estimators is important for the analysis of the segments where data availability, at 
least for some specific industries, is limited to about 50 companies. 
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inventories. For instance, our results suggest that a 1% increase in costumer concentration is 
associated with a 0.08% and a 0.18% increase in absolute and relative inventories respectively. 
We also find that a similar link holds for the Chemicals, Metal Manufacturing, Electronics and 
Food & Beverages segments, where higher customer concentrations are associated with an 
increase in both absolute and relative inventory. All in all, the above results do not provide support 
to Hypothesis 2 that higher customer density would lead to lower inventory levels, and are at odds 
with two recent studies which document a negative link between customer concentration and 
inventory holdings for US firms (see Ak and Patatoukas (2016), and Cachon and Olivares 
(2010)).15 We posit that Chinese firms might act in a precautionary way to minimize the likelihood 
of stock-outs. The stock out-avoidance motive is fostered by the argument that the frictions 
involved in international transactions are more severe than those for domestic transactions, 
leading therefore firms which engage in international trade to hold larger inventories (Alessandria 
et al. (2011)). We can only observe that given the predominant role of Chinese firms in 
international trade, the latter explanation could fit well our results, meaning that firms that rely on 
fewer customers might fear over-exposure to the risk of stock-outs that would lose them precious 
customers. Such risk becomes more severe for firms engaging in international trade, as their 
deliveries tend to be lumpier due to the higher costs of serving foreign markets. 
Our results provide strong support for Hypothesis 3 that account receivables and payables 
are positively associated with inventory holdings. This finding is particularly strong for absolute 
inventories, as both are significant at the 1% level, and it is in line with the strand of studies 
documenting that inventory holdings are positively correlated with both the volume of trade credit 
and trade debit (see Fabbri and Klapper, 2009; Brigham and Houston, 2009; Mittal, 2010; 
Ferrando and Mulier, 2013). The same hypothesis holds only partially for relative inventories 
which are strongly associated with receivables only. For instance, a 1% increase in account 
receivables is, on average, associated with increases which range from 0.08 to 0.09% for absolute, 
and from 0.09 to 0.13% for relative inventories. When we run segment-specific regressions, we 
find that account payables and receivables are positively associated with inventory holdings in 
the Machinery, Pharmaceutical, Electronics, Food & Beverages segments, and the Machinery, 
Metal Manufacturing and Food & Beverage industries respectively. With regard to the Chemicals 
                                                          
15 Similarly, we do not find any evidence in support of the demand fragmentation hypothesis. 
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and Pharmaceutical segments, we obtain instead evidence that account receivables are negatively 
associated with inventory holdings. This last result is consistent with the strand of literature 
showing that inventory holdings decline as firms extend more credit to customers (see, e.g., 
Bougheas et al., 2009). 
We then shed light on the relationship between inventories and bad debts finding strong 
support for Hypothesis 4, as absolute and relative inventory holdings are negatively associated 
with levels of bad debts. For instance, a 1% increase in the bad debt ratio is associated with a 
decrease in absolute and relative inventory holdings of 0.68 and 0.50% respectively. Similarly, 
we find support for Hypothesis 5 that the sensitivity of absolute and relative inventories to changes 
in bad debt ratio decreases with the volume of payables held by firms. For instance, our results 
suggest that a 1% increase in account payables from their average value decreases in absolute 
terms the elasticity of inventories to bad debts from -0.018 to -0.012. We find relationships of the 
same sign and similar magnitude for relative inventories. When we run segment-specific 
regressions we find strong support for both these hypotheses in the Machinery and Food & 
Beverage segments, whereas the tested relationships are not significant for the Pharmaceutical, 
Metal Manufacturing, and Electronics segments.  
We then focus on Hypotheses 6, 7 and 8, a set of predictions which has been only partially 
explored for the Chinese economy. We obtain strong support for the hypothesis that inventory 
level is positively associated with mean demand through a concave function. In fact, the elasticity 
of absolute inventory to CoGS takes values between 0.54 and 0.63, and inventories are therefore 
a sub-linear function of sales - implying a concave relationship with presence of economies of 
scale. For instance, we find that a 1% increase in CoGS is, on average, associated with an increase 
in absolute inventories within the range 0.54-0.63 percent. The same hypothesis holds across all 
segments with the elasticity coefficients spanning from 0.98 for Metal Manufacturing to 0.31 for 
Machinery. On the contrary, we find weak support for Hypothesis 7 that relative inventory level 
is negatively associated with the size of firms. In fact, for the entire sample relative inventories 
are negatively associated to fixed assets, with the estimated coefficient being not statistically 
significant. Similar results hold also for the different segments under scrutiny. Finally, our results 
are consistent with Hypothesis 8 as both absolute and relative inventory are positively related with 
product margins, with elasticity coefficients statistically significant at the 1% level. Moreover, 
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such relationship holds also when tested across all industries with the exception of the Machinery 
segment.  
The bottom panels of Tables from 3 to 5 report a battery of diagnostic tests to check whether 
Eqs. (3) and (4) are correctly specified. When the two models are estimated on pooled data, F-
tests soundly reject the null that all the explanatory variables are jointly not statistically 
significant. While the Breusch-Pagan and Harvey tests suggest the presence of moderate 
heteroscedasticity, the White test soundly rejects the null of homoscedasticity for both the 
specifications. The RESET tests consistently fail to reject the null of no specification errors at the 
10 and 1% level for the two specifications. The MWD tests fail to reject the null that the log-log 
specification of Eqs. (3) and (4) are preferable to standard additive models at the 1% level. We 
obtain a similar pattern of results when we run the segment-specific regressions. All in all, the 
above statistics suggest that both Eqs. (3) and (4) are reasonably well specified. 
We then check for the robustness of our empirical results by carrying out the following 
empirical exercises. Firstly, as fixed asset encompasses intangible assets that might not be 
necessarily associated with the size of firms, we re-estimate Eq. (4) by replacing these last with 
total sales. Secondly, as our dataset can be partitioned into different industrial segments, the level 
and type of heteroscedasticity might be dependent on such industries. We therefore re-estimate 
Eqs. (3) and (4) by using cluster-robust OLS methods (Cameron and Miller, 2015). Thirdly, we 
re-estimate the two specifications on a restricted dataset constructed by dropping observations for 
which the standardised regression residuals in absolute value are greater than 2.5. Finally, we 
carry out MR estimates by using as priors a set of results previously obtained by Rumyantsev and 
Netessine (2007). Taken together, the empirical results obtained suggest that the sign, magnitude 
and statistical significance of the estimated parameters are consistent with the estimates set out in 
Tables 3, 4 and 5.  
 
TABLES 3, 4 AND 5 HERE 
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7.  Conclusions 
This study sheds light on the linkages between specific features of the supply chain and 
inventory holdings for a large dataset of Chinese manufacturing companies. We begin our study 
by exploring the linkage between supplier and customer density, and inventory holdings. We then 
extend the analysis to investigate the role of financial indicators – such as account payables and 
receivables - on inventory management. We do so by gauging the marginal impact of the above 
factors within one setting. These are the novel contributions of this study to the emerging literature 
on inventory management and supply chain structure.  
In line with the OM view, we find that more concentrated supply-bases - enabling a better 
co-ordination between firms and suppliers – are associated with lower inventory levels. When we 
look at the individual industries, such relationship is particularly strong for the Chemicals and 
Electronics segments. We then focus on the lower end of the supply chain by looking into the 
relationship between inventory levels and customer density. Our results suggest a positive link 
between the concentration of customers and inventory holdings, so that we obtain evidence 
consistent with the so-called Bargaining Power view. Such relationship is particularly strong for 
relative inventories across the full sample, as well as for absolute inventories in the Chemicals, 
Metal Manufacturing and Food & Beverages segments. This last result is at odds with some 
previous findings that document a negative link between customer concentration and inventory 
holdings for US firms. We make sense of this result by noting that Chinese firms operate in 
international markets with a large variety of products and high substitutability, with customers 
prone to switch supplier in case of stock-out. In this scenario, firms might become highly sensitive 
to the risk of losing customers and therefore willing to stock up higher inventories for 
precautionary reasons.16 The importance of stocking up inventories strengthen when firms sell to 
fewer international customers. 
When we extend our analysis to the role of financial factors, we document how payables 
and receivables are positively associated with inventory holdings, lending support to the idea that 
both credit received and extended are positively linked - so that firms can finance the production 
                                                          
16 A similar argument was proposed by Netessine et al. (2005). 
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and sustain sales. Only for the Chemicals and Pharmaceutical segments we find evidence in line 
with the conventional view that inventory holdings decline as firms extend more trade credit.  
We then show that both absolute and relative inventory holdings are negatively associated 
with the level of bad debts, suggesting that firms that are more financially constrained - i.e. those 
more exposed to potential losses generated by the default of customers - have to reduce their levels 
of inventories. The use of bad debts is novel in the inventory management literature and our 
findings supplement the empirical evidence already reported that other financial flows, such as 
various types of margins and cash flows, are associated with inventory holdings. However, we 
also find that as the volume of payables increases, the sensitivity of absolute and relative 
inventories to changes in the bad debt ratio decreases. This is because the amount of payables acts 
in the opposite way to bad debts - i.e. the higher the trade credit received and the less financially 
constrained is likely to be the firm - making the impact of bad debts less severe. When looking at 
the segment analysis, the relationships involving bad debts hold for the Machinery, Chemicals 
and Food & Beverages segments. 
Finally, we test for a number of hypotheses on inventory holdings already largely 
investigated for developed economies, but only partially explored on Chinese data. In line with 
the existing literature, we find that the elasticity of absolute inventory to demand is lower than 
one, suggesting the presence of economies of scale in inventory management. Such elasticity 
varies across segments, with Metal manufacturing showing nearly constant returns to scale and 
Machinery displaying the strongest economies of scale. We also find that higher gross margins 
are associated with larger inventories.  
These results offer several implications for managers. Firstly, the structure of the upper- and 
lower-stream supply chain has sizeable impact on inventory holdings, as managers can create 
value by increasing the concentration of suppliers and decreasing that of customers. However, the 
positive impact arising from the management of supply- and customer-bases varies across the 
different segments under scrutiny. Secondly, the finding that higher levels of bad credits have a 
negative effect on inventories suggests that managers should extend receivables to customers with 
particular care. The trade-off between the issuance of receivables and the likelihood of facing 
non-performing loans requires skilful judgment, constant monitoring, and gathering of 
information on the lower stream of the supply chain. Finally, the finding that firms less financially 
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constrained - i.e. firms with full access to payables - are less sensitive to the level of bad debts 
than firms more financially constrained, provides support to the view that managers should take 
particular care in removing or mitigating the financial constraints faced by firms. More 
specifically, firms with full access to trade payments can benefit from a more flexible management 
of inventories, something that managers should take into consideration when shaping the upper-
stream supply chain. Taken together with the previous point, this highlights a dependency that 
requires firms to integrate activities across the whole supply chain. 
We conclude by briefly discussing the main limitations of our study and some avenues for 
future research. Unfortunately, the lack of available data on supplier and customer density has 
limited our study to a cross-section analysis. While the use of cross-section data has provided us 
with a neat picture of the link between the supply chain structure and inventory holdings, such 
data prevent us from shedding light on their time dynamics. Another limitation is that our analysis 
neglects a number of important firms’ features - such as the type of business (B2B or B2C) and 
production (make-to-order vs make-to-stock), the position within the supply chain and the degree 
of internationalization in the market of sourcing and distribution - that could be important 
determinants of inventory holdings. While this is a promising development, the gathering of such 
data is compounded by the fact that they are not readably available from financial statements. We 
leave the above tasks in our agenda for future research.  
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Table 1 - Mean, median and standard deviation of Inventories, Cost of goods sold (CoGS), Inventories/CoGS, Density of 
suppliers (SC) and Density of customers (CC) for six homogeneous segments.      
Segment  Obs Mean Inventory, ¥M Mean COGS, ¥M  Mean Inv/COGS  Mean SC   Mean CC 
   (median, std dev) (median, std dev)  (median, std dev) (median, std dev) (median, std dev) 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Machinery  122 2,591 (503; 5,701) 10,09 (1,911; 37,73) 0.389 (0.321; 0.326) 0.274 (0.231; 0.163) 0.337 (0.270; 0.222) 
Electronics  95 1,518 (512; 3,015) 7,200 (1,843; 15,03) 0.724 (0.264; 3.987) 0.354 (0.304; 0.197) 0.350 (0.290; 0.230) 
Chemicals  86 715 (404; 828)  3,793 (2,393; 4,616) 0.275 (0.170; 6.895) 0.421 (0.383; 0.207) 0.250 (0.200; 0.175) 
Pharmaceuticals 48 631 (397; 806)  1,916 (1,068; 2,240) 0.622 (0.333; 0.964) 0.232 (0.186; 0.137) 0.190 (0.155; 0.117) 
Food & Beverage 40 1,256 (681; 1,535) 5,493 (1,345; 12,43) 0.149 (0.398; 0.603) 0.292 (0.275; 0.179) 0.211 (0.161; 0.185) 
Metal Manufacturing 52 5,060 (1,790; 6,369) 26,424 (9,861; 36,90) 0.258 (0.169; 0.232) 0.400 (0.364; 0.223) 0.280 (0.238; 0.190) 
Total  443 1,954 (641; 3,351) 8,865 (2,780; 20,21) 0.427 (0.270; 2.469) 0.332 (0.291; 0.185) 0.289 (0.235; 0.196) 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: Inventories (Inv) and Cost of goods sold (CoGS) expressed in millions of Chinese Yuan at the end of 2012.  
Supplier (SC) and Costumer Concentration (CC) computed according to Eqs. (1) and (2). 
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Table 2 - Descriptive statistics for dependent and explanatory variables of Eqs. (3) and (4).    
log(Inv) log(Inv/CoGS) log(CoGS) log(Fasset) log(GMG) log(SC) log(CC) log(AcPay) log(AcRec) log(BadDebt)      log(BadDebt)
                                           x log(AcPay) 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Mean 20.21 -1.319 21.53 21.33 0.260 -1.268 -1.499 19.66 19.56 -2.447 -48.80 
Std Dev 1.452 0.861 1.517 1.415 0.296 0.649 0.752 1.580 1.612 1.161 23.91 
Min 16.12 -4.215 15.89 16.82 -0.221 -4.034 -4.063 14.67 13.10 -9.784 -89.65 
Max 24.20 3.666 26.72 25.58 3.801 0.000 -0.005 24.59 23.94 -0.006 -0.107 
Obs 516 516 516 516 516 516 516 516 516 516 516 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
log(Inv) 1.000           
log(Inv/CoGS) 0.213 1.000          
log(CoGS) 0.834 -0.362 1.000         
log(Fasset) 0.768 -0.143 0.813 1.000        
log(GMG) -0.045 0.416 -0.278 -0.067 1.000       
log(SC) -0.323 -0.141 -0.228 -0.248 -0.143 1.000      
log(CC) -0.300 0.059 -0.320 -0.368 -0.111 0.368 1.000     
log(AcPay) 0.828 -0.089 0.841 0.782 -0.108 -0.343 -0.265 1.000    
log(AcRec) 0.607 0.079 0.535 0.453 -0.029 -0.295 -0.128 0.698 1.000   
log(BD) -0.240 0.074 -0.271 -0.173 0.018 0.041 -0.069 -0.243 -0.269 1.000  
log(BadDebt) -0.354 0.084 -0.385 -0.286 0.029 0.094 -0.028 -0.384 -0.364 0.985 1.000  
× log(AcPay) 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Eigenvalues¹   3.177 - 1.684 1.228 0.779 0.637 0.379 0.111 0.004 
Eigenvalues¹   - 3.056 1.739 1.144 0.774 0.659 0.441 0.144 0.003 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: Inventories (Inv), Cost of goods sold (CoGS), Fixed Assets (FAsset), Account Payables (AcPay) and Receivables (AcRec) expressed in millions of Chinese Yuan at the end of 2012. Gross 
Margin Ratio (GMG) computed using the formula GMG = (SALES- CoGS)/SALES. BadDebt computed as ratio between reserves for bad debt and book value of Account Receivables.  
Supplier (SC) and Costumer Concentration (CC) computed according to Eqs. (1) and (2).  
¹ Eigenvalues obtained for the matrix XX' where X is the design matrix of Eqs. (3) and (4) with dimension (516 x 8).  
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Table 3 - Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Least Absolute Deviations (LAD), Mixed (MIXED) and Ridge (RIDGE) regression 
estimates of Eqs. (3) and (4).   
Explanatory              Eq.(3)              Eq.(4)     
Variables  OLS LAD MIXED RIDGE  OLS LAD MIXED RIDGE 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Const  0.398 -0.974 0.580 0.421  -3.032*** -2.936*** -2.561*** -2.139*** 
  (0.845) (0.897) (0.519) (0.697)  (0.929) (0.992) (0.478) (0.729) 
 
log(CoGS)  0.544*** 0.626*** 0.596*** 0.607***  - - - -  
  (0.044) (0.043) (0.055) (0.052)  (  -  ) (  -  ) (  -  ) (  -  )  
  
log(Fasset)  - - - -  -0.017 -0.019 -0.036 -0.038  
(  -  ) (  -  ) (  -  ) (  -  )  (0.039) (0.040) (0.035) (0.037) 
 
log(GMG)  0.719*** 0.618*** 0.752*** 0.741***  1.115*** 1.190*** 1.139*** 1.139*** 
(0.106) (0.116) (0.156) (0.153)  (0.109) (0.115) (0.142) (0.146) 
 
log(SC)  -0.093* -0.116** -0.133*** -0.146**  -0.142*** -0.175*** -0.220*** -0.218*** 
(0.051) (0.055) (0.060) (0.058)  (0.055) (0.058) (0.060) (0.061) 
 
log(CC)  0.028 0.082* 0.044 0.024  0.175*** 0.184*** 0.138*** 0.136*** 
(0.045) (0.047) (0.051) (0.049)  (0.048) (0.051) (0.050) (0.051) 
 
log(AcPay)  0.325*** 0.291*** 0.251*** 0.241***  0.020 -0.037 -0.015 -0.034  
  (0.054) (0.057) (0.068) (0.063)  (0.054) (0.057) (0.052) (0.050) 
 
log(AcRec)  0.077*** 0.091*** 0.082*** 0.084***  0.087*** 0.135*** 0.106*** 0.106*** 
  (0.026) (0.027) (0.032) (0.031)  (0.029) (0.030) (0.032) (0.033) 
 
log(BadDebt)  -0.196 -0.667** -0.349 -0.195  -0.507* -0.329 -0.392** -0.206  
  (0.291) (0.309) (0.239) (0.199)  (0.313) (0.335) (0.202) (0.166) 
 
log(BadDebt)  0.011 0.035*** 0.018 0.010  0.029* 0.021 0.023*** 0.013* 
× log(AcPay)  (0.015) (0.016) (0.012) (0.010)  (0.016) (0.017) (0.010) (0.008)  
     
F-test¹  256.1 224.3 319.0 230.7  18.27 21.51 17.64 16.31  
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
RESET²  2.240 2.262 1.395 1.925  2.787 3.405 3.041 3.903  
  (0.083) (0.106) (0.248) (0.147)  (0.041) (0.034) (0.029) (0.021) 
 
B-P³  46.29 35.38 76.23 32.33  36.27 21.27 20.13 20.54  
  (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.029)  (0.004) (0.266) (0.325) (0.197) 
 
MWD⁴  0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.001  0.024 0.171 0.163 0.161  
(0.039) (0.375) (0.005) (0.001)  (0.734) (0.013) (0.029) (0.020) 
 
HARV⁵  228 19.51 35.78 264  294 17.88 15.20 296  
  (0.000) (0.361) (0.007) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.463) (0.648) (0.000) 
 
WHITE⁶  139.7 64.48 115.1 73.72  117.8 64.43 62.26 67.79  
  (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.008)  (0.000) (0.002) (0.004) (0.016) 
 
R²  0.819 0.781 0.754 0.793  0.325 0.224 0.281 0.254  
N   511 511 511 511  511 511 511 511 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________Notes: 
OLS, LAD, Mixed and Ridge regression estimates of Eqs.(3) and (4) with dependent variables ln(Invi) and ln(Invi/CoGSi). MR estimates obtained by using priors taken from LAD estimates. * (**) 
[***] significant at 10, (5) and [1] percent level.       
¹ F-test for the null that all the regressors are jointly not statistically significant. P-value in parentheses.       
² RESET test for the null of no specification errors. P-values in parentheses.        
³ Breusch-Pagan test for the null of homoscedasticity. P-values in parentheses.        
⁴ MacKinnon-White-Davidson (1983) test for the null of correct specification. P-values in parentheses.       
⁵ Harvey test for the null of homoscedasticity. P-values in parentheses.         
⁶ White test for the null of homoscedasticity. P-values in parentheses.         
Adjusted R squared calculated as 1−(RSS/TSS)×(N-1)/(N−k).         
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Table 4 - Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Least Absolute Deviations (LAD) estimates of Eqs.(3) and (4) for six 
homogeneous segments.        
   Machinery    Chemicals   Pharmaceuticals 
Explanatory           Eq.(3)            Eq.(4)               Eq.(3)             Eq.(4)              Eq.(3)             Eq.(4)  
Variables OLS LAD OLS LAD OLS LAD OLS LAD OLS LAD OLS LAD 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Const -4.507*** -4.765** -6.492*** -5.064** -3.333* -4.523* -5.119* -6.849** 3.007 4.353 1.604 0.860
 (1.796) (2.105) (2.165) (2.437) (1.785) (2.376) (2.589) (2.814) (2.212) (3.235) (2.419) (2.663) 
 
log(CoGS) 0.314*** 0.360*** - - 0.330*** 0.528*** - - 0.387* 0.442* - -
 (0.103) (0.113) (  -  ) (  -  ) (0.101) (0.117) (  -  ) (  -  ) (0.221) (0.253) (  -  ) (  -  ) 
 
log(Fasset) - - 0.005 0.064 - - -0.186 -0.160 - - 0.041 0.047
 (  -  ) (  -  ) (0.099) (0.094) (  -  ) (  -  ) (0.115) (0.125) (  -  ) (  -  ) (0.105) (0.116) 
 
log(GMG) 0.450 0.644 0.861 1.229* 0.118 0.340* 0.902*** 0.888*** 0.635** 0.729** 0.829***       0.826*** 
(0.511) (0.560) (0.697) (0.642) (0.121) (0.204) (0.170) (0.185) (0.239) (0.309) (0.210) (0.232) 
 
log(SC) -0.045 -0.011 -0.168 -0.153 -0.199* -0.043 -0.040 0.022 0.134 0.078 0.103 0.078
 (0.115) (0.105) (0.131) (0.120) (0.108) (0.107) (0.117) (0.125) (0.177) (0.232) (0.155) (0.171) 
 
log(CC) -0.098 -0.100 0.110 0.119 0.660*** 0.514*** 0.275 0.316* -0.159 -0.095 0.051 0.014
 (0.089) (0.094) (0.093) (0.105) (0.115) (0.154) (0.169) (0.184) (0.204) (0.195) (0.154) (0.169) 
 
log(AcPay) 0.507*** 0.440*** -0.113 -0.263* -0.110 -0.178 -0.264* -0.252* 0.488** 0.565** 0.071 0.232
 (0.141) (0.149) (0.141) (0.149) (0.143) (0.135) (0.145) (0.157) (0.228) (0.278) (0.152) (0.167) 
 
log(AcRec) 0.366*** 0.399*** 0.363*** 0.378*** -2.486*** -2.411*** -2.242** -2.397** -0.040 -0.249 -0.249**      -0.385*** 
(0.051) (0.065) (0.057) (0.075) (0.590) (0.814) (0.901) (0.982) (0.134) (0.151) (0.112) (0.124) 
 
log(BadDebt) -1.572** -1.962*** -1.319* -0.806 0.122*** 0.120** 0.068 0.088 0.104 1.646 0.602 0.950
 (0.725) (0.720) (0.766) (0.831) (0.039) (0.049) (0.053) (0.057) (1.194) (1.597) (1.162) (1.279) 
 
log(BadDebt) 0.075** 0.095*** 0.068* 0.044 0.117*** 0.114*** 0.108** 0.116** 0.000 -0.079 -0.025 -0.043 x 
log(AcPay) (0.034) (0.035) (0.037) (0.041) (0.028) (0.040) (0.045) (0.049) (0.063) (0.084) (0.062) (0.068)
         
F-test¹ 170.1 79.71 9.298 4.638 78.61 31.77 30.37 5.339 33.26 17.97 6.627 2.967
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) 
 
RESET² 0.011 0.389 0.135 2.105 0.081 2.047 0.619 0.568 1.249 1.393 1.604 1.391
 (0.988) (0.678) (0.873) (0.127) (0.922) (0.140) (0.541) (0.569) (0.298) (0.261) (0.214) (0.262) 
 
B-P³ 17.32 22.81 29.89 31.91 6.743 4.511 4.185 3.557 11.48 11.09 10.78 11.79
 (0.027) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.564) (0.810) (0.840) (0.894) (0.175) (0.196) (0.148) (0.161) 
 
MWD⁴ 0.001 0.001 2.005 2.927 0.001 0.001 -0.050 0.075 0.001 0.001 1.221 1.921
 (0.018) (0.037) (0.006) (0.011) (0.011) (0.388) (0.273) (0.265) (0.004) (0.452) (0.004) (0.036) 
 
HARV⁵ 5.762 11.83 14.55 16.16 17.53 10.74 26.56 8.552 9.265 9.023 14.77 5.129
 (0.763) (0.106) (0.068) (0.040) (0.025) (0.220) (0.000) (0.384) (0.320) (0.341) (0.064) (0.744) 
 
WHITE⁶ 62.76 62.48 68.77 75.24 48.55 23.75 35.52 38.86 38.26 39.94 42.02 38.14
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.079) (0.941) (0.491) (0.474) (0.367) (0.299) (0.226) (0.372) 
 
R² 0.867 0.806 0.223 0.161 0.770 0.752 0.360 0.301 0.778 0.695 0.476 0.613 
 
N  122 122 122 122 84 84 84 84 48 48 48 48 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: OLS and LAD empirical estimates of Eqs.(3) and (4) with dependent variables ln(Invi) and ln(Invi/CoGSi).      
* (**) [***] significant at 10, (5) and [1] percent level.          
¹ F-test for the null that all the regressors are jointly not statistically significant. P-value in parentheses.      
² RESET test for the null of no specification errors. P-values in parentheses.        
³ Breush-Pagan test for the null of homoscedasticity. P-values in parentheses.       
⁴ MacKinnon-White-Davidson (1983) test for the null of correct specification. P-values in parentheses.      
⁵ Harvey test for the null of homoscedasticity. P-values in parentheses.         
⁶ White test for the null of homoscedasticity. P-values in parentheses.        
Adjusted R squared calculated as 1−(RSS/TSS)×(N-1)/(N−k).   
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Table 5 - Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Least Absolute Deviations (LAD) estimates of Eqs.(3) and (4) for six 
homogeneous segments.        
  Metal Manufacturing   Electricals    Food & Beverage  
Explanatory           Eq.(3)            Eq.(4)               Eq.(3)             Eq.(4)              Eq.(3)             Eq.(4)  
Variables OLS LAD OLS LAD OLS LAD OLS LAD OLS LAD OLS LAD 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Const -2.302 -5.917** -3.608* -5.497** 0.755 1.686 -4.050* -4.112* -4.589 -5.610 -5.188             -8.204**
 (1.933) (2.609) (1.852) (2.263) (1.741) (1.945) (2.056) (2.107) (3.431) (4.064) (3.746) (3.858)
  
log(CoGS) 0.901*** 0.987*** - - 0.371*** 0.413*** - - 0.511** 0.416* - -
 (0.097) (0.118) (  -  ) (  -  ) (0.085) (0.090) (  -  ) (  -  ) (0.198) (0.244) (  -  ) (  -  )
   
log(Fasset) - - -0.083 -0.057 - - 0.132* 0.045 - - -0.111 -0.133
 (  -  ) (  -  ) (0.113) (0.136) (  -  ) (  -  ) (0.078) (0.080) (  -  ) (  -  ) (0.196) (0.202)
  
log(GMG) 2.187* 3.766*** 3.716*** 3.807*** 0.524 0.786 1.555*** 1.540*** 1.278*** 1.498*** 1.553***       1.418***
 (1.163) (0.946) (0.709) (0.792) (0.418) (0.506) (0.473) (0.485) (0.299) (0.369) (0.282) (0.291)
  
log(SC) 0.040 -0.018 0.068 -0.005 -0.088 -0.074 -0.411*** -0.321*** -0.231 -0.350 -0.080 -0.172
 (0.098) (0.152) (0.125) (0.152) (0.105) (0.121) (0.115) (0.118) (0.226) (0.276) (0.226) (0.233)
  
log(CC) 0.153 0.325** 0.220* 0.254 -0.023 0.010 0.152* 0.044 0.363** 0.437** 0.429**           0.478**
 (0.117) (0.151) (0.132) (0.160) (0.071) (0.086) (0.082) (0.084) (0.171) (0.209) (0.183) (0.188)  
 
log(AcPay) 0.034 0.075 0.073 0.120 0.499*** 0.404*** -0.048 0.058 0.568* 0.654* 0.085 0.260
 (0.090) (0.121) (0.118) (0.143) (0.109) (0.133) (0.120) (0.123) (0.280) (0.341) (0.234) (0.241) 
  
log(AcRec) 0.119* 0.172* 0.132 0.150 0.066 0.070 0.018 0.010 0.138* 0.196* 0.241***       0.245***
 (0.068) (0.103) (0.085) (0.104) (0.072) (0.086) (0.086) (0.088) (0.083) (0.102) (0.082) (0.085)  
 
log(BadDebt) 0.225 -0.581 -0.088 -0.549 -0.320 0.075 -0.609 -0.799 -3.024* -4.359** -4.099**      -5.504***
 (0.543) (0.793) (0.638) (0.778) (0.585) (0.660) (0.687) (0.704) (1.576) (1.933) (1.673) (1.723)
  
log(BadDebt)  -0.010 0.034 0.007 0.032 0.020 0.000 0.034 0.045 0.148* 0.208** 0.194**         0.266*** 
x log(AcPay) (0.028) (0.040) (0.032) (0.039) (0.029) (0.033) (0.034) (0.035) (0.081) (0.099) (0.084) (0.087) 
 
F-test¹ 72.81 39.50 2.289 5.096 86.61 60.14 5.938 4.259 29.42 12.91 23.42 7.368
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.019) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
RESET² 1.045 5.747 0.961 0.004 3.092 2.309 12.84 0.234 0.662 0.948 0.209 0.455
 (0.361) (0.006) (0.391) (0.996) (0.051) (0.106) (0.000) (0.792) (0.523) (0.399) (0.812) (0.639) 
 
B-P³ 12.37 11.79 9.697 11.68 21.16 34.07 35.09 16.63 6.388 7.720 7.230 5.231
 (0.135) (0.161) (0.287) (0.166) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.024) (0.604) (0.461) (0.405) (0.732) 
 
MWD⁴ 0.001 0.001 1.744 -0.079 0.001 0.001 0.002 1.232 0.001 0.001 0.261 0.887
 (0.068) (0.397) (0.282) (0.927) (0.065) (0.293) (0.946) (0.000) (0.562) (0.878) (0.520) (0.107) 
 
HARV⁵ 7.593 4.505 3.076 6.581 9.924 9.947 16.24 12.81 6.754 13.35 9.869 12.80
 (0.474) (0.809) (0.929) (0.582) (0.270) (0.268) (0.039) (0.118) (0.563) (0.100) (0.274) (0.118) 
 
WHITE⁶ 36.40 42.83 41.00 46.53 47.15 74.29 76.74 44.18 37.59 37.76 38.81 37.00
 (0.449) (0.201) (0.260) (0.112) (0.101) (0.000) (0.000) (0.164) (0.396) (0.388) (0.344) (0.422) 
 
R² 0.893 0.860 0.520 0.161 0.853 0.733 0.256 0.482 0.819 0.662 0.967 0.667 
 
N  51 51 51 51 93 93 93 93 38 38 38 38 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: OLS and LAD empirical estimates of Eqs.(3) and (4) with dependent variables ln(Invi) and ln(Invi/CoGSi).      
* (**) [***] significant at 10, (5) and [1] percent level.          
¹ F-test for the null that all the regressors are jointly not statistically significant. P-value in parentheses.      
² RESET test for the null of no specification errors. P-values in parentheses.        
³ Breush-Pagan test for the null of homoscedasticity. P-values in parentheses.       
⁴ MacKinnon-White-Davidson (1983) test for the null of correct specification. P-values in parentheses.      
⁵ Harvey test for the null of homoscedasticity. P-values in parentheses.         
⁶ White test for the null of homoscedasticity. P-values in parentheses.        
Adjusted R squared calculated as 1−(RSS/TSS)×(N-1)/(N−k).         
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Figure 1 – Kernel probability distributions of logarithm of Absolute Inventories (log(Inv)) for Food & Beverages, 
Metal Manufacture, Chemicals, Pharmaceutical, Machinery and Electronics segments. 
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Figure 2 – Kernel probability distributions of logarithm of Relative Inventories (log(Inv/CoGS)) for Food & 
Beverages, Metal Manufacture, Chemicals, Pharmaceutical, Machinery and Electronics segments.   
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